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Abstract 
 
The question of why OECD countries are turning to active labour market policy 
in rather different ways has recently attracted substantial attention by the 
comparative social policy research community. However, we seem to be far 
from a satisfactory account of the determinants of active labour market policy. 
This is shown by the conflicting findings published recently by Huo et al. 
(2008) who argue that left power is one of the key determinants of the devel-
opment of active labour market policy, and Rueda (2007) who claims that left 
power is either irrelevant or negatively related to this trend. Using statistical 
analysis this paper contributes to this debate. It tests several hypotheses, in-
cluding left power, the role of the trade unions, the role of labour market insti-
tutions, and the role of competing expenditure. It concludes that the strength of 
the left matters, but in conjunction with economic openness. It also argues that 
the expansion of ALMPs is currently limited by spending commitments in other 
areas of the welfare state.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Active labour market polices (ALMPs) are an important area of social policy 
making. Over the last decade, an active approach to labour market policy has 
been promoted by international agencies and adopted in several OECD coun-
tries. These developments have impacted on the funds that are assigned to 
active policies. Among OECD countries, between 1980 and 2003 the propor-
tion of GDP invested in this field has nearly doubled, going from 0.4 to 0.7 of 
GDP. While increase in ALMP spending has been a general trend, massive 
cross national differences persist. In 2003, for instance, spending ranged be-
tween 0.2 % of GDP (USA) and 1.6% Denmark. 
 
Extreme levels of cross-national variation are not the only puzzle one encoun-
ters when studying ALMPs, though. One key question that remains unsolved 
is whether Social democratic power is associated with more or less emphasis 
on ALMPs. This puzzle has been highlighted by two recent studies that deal 
precisely with this issue, use the same data, different methods, and reach op-
posite conclusions. According to Jingjing Huo and his colleagues, Social de-
mocratic power is a key factor in the expansion of ALMPs (Huo et al., 2008). 
The opposite view is defended by David Rueda, who claims that as a result of 
recent socioeconomic transformations, Social democrats are now under pres-
sure to oppose ALMPs, and expects no clear effect of Social democratic 
power.  
 
Using quantitative data and statistical modelling, this paper seeks to shed light 
on this unresolved puzzle. More generally, it contributes to understand what 
economic, political and institutional conditions are more likely to lead to the 
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development of ALMPs. My claim is that Social democratic power does matter 
for the expansion of ALMPs, but only in the context of an economically open 
economy. Powerful Social democrats are likely to fight for policies that improve 
the quality of life of their key constituency: waged-workers. Instinctively, they 
will tend to turn quick and direct improvements, through employment protec-
tion, decommodification and early retirement. However, in the context of an 
internationally exposed economy, these policies will not be a viable option be-
cause they would excessively penalise national producers. Powerful Social 
democratic parties in open economies will be caught under two contrasting 
pressures: further the interests of wage earners and preserve the competitive-
ness of national producers. ALMPs allow them to do this. 
 
The development ALMPs is also likely to be affected by policy feedback ef-
fects that pertain to decisions taken in other fields of the welfare state. Today 
there is a clear consensus in favour of investment in ALMPs, but for countries 
that are grappling with the issue of financing the existing social programmes in 
the context of an ageing population, it will be difficult to free up the funds 
needed to set up a well functioning system of ALMPs. As a result, one can hy-
pothesise a negative relationship between the amounts spent on traditional 
social policies, most notably old age pensions, and the expansion of ALMPs. 
The implication is that countries that started developing ALMPs earlier, before 
the rise of concerns for the financial stability of pension system, had an advan-
tage relative to those who turn to these policies in the 2000s. If this hypothesis 
is correct, what we may witness is the crowding out of social spending on pro-
grammes other than those which are age- related.  
 
The paper begins with a descriptive account of activation across OECD coun-
tries. It then moves on to discuss theoretical propositions that ambition to ac-
count for the observed variation. Next comes the statistical analysis and the 
results, which are discussed in the final section. 
 
 
Mapping cross-national variation in active la-
bour market policy 
The standard approach used by social policy researchers to measure the ex-
tent of development of a policy, is to look at how much is spent on it as a pro-
portion of GDP. The approach, that will be followed here has been rightly criti-
cised1, but it remains one of the most efficient ways to summarise complex in-
formation regarding a policy domain. One should nonetheless be aware the 
problems involved. 
 
                                                  
1 See e.g.Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge, Polity Press, Siegel, 
N. A. (2000) Jenseits der Expansion?  Sozialpolitik in westlichen Demokratien 1975-95. IN Schmidt, M. G. 
(Ed.) Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik. Institutionen, politischer Prozesse und Leistungsprofil. Opladen, Leske und 
Budrich. 
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Academic discussions of activation have shown the difficulties involved in de-
fining the development of active labour market policies simply in  terms of ex-
pansion of the welfare state (Clasen, 2000, Torfing, 1999) + Lodemel and 
Trickey). In some cases, activation can be implemented through stronger in-
centives or sanctions for rejecting job offers. These measures do not neces-
sarily entail higher spending, and do not show up in expenditure figures. On 
the contrary, they may result in lower outlays, if they are based on benefit re-
ductions. At the other extreme, policies that are classified as “active”, may 
simply be based on providing alternatives to market employment, de facto re-
moving unemployed people from the workforce. Since these programmes tend 
to be costly, a focus on spending will overestimate the extent of activation that 
goes on in countries that have relied on these instruments, such as France.  
One should keep these problems in mind when looking at the figures pre-
sented here. 
 
An additional problem one encounters when assessing comparatively the de-
gree of development of active labour market policy is the partly automatic rela-
tionship between the rate of unemployment and the level of spending on these 
polices. Increases in the number of unemployed people will, ceteris paribus, 
result in higher spending on ALMPs, at least to the extent that funds are avail-
able to finance additional participation to the various relevant programmes. 
This automatic link between unemployment and ALMP spending may distort 
the picture one gets when looking only at spending as a percent of GDP. For 
this reason, table 1 provides also an unemployment weighted measure of 
ALMPs spending, consisting simply in the original figure (provided in the first 
column) divided by the unemployment rate. This correction assumes a linear 
relationship between the unemployment rate and spending, which may not re-
flect reality well. In fact, as the unemployment rate goes up during a recession, 
spending on ALMPs may well reach budget limits and stop growing, which 
would make the relationship look curvilinear (inverted quadratic). This short-
coming does not constitute too a serious problem for the present descriptive 
analysis, but may impact on the results obtained through statistical modelling. 
That’s why the issue is brought up again in the section of methods. 
 
 
The picture emerging from table 3.1. is quite clear. The Nordic welfare states 
are by far the most involved in active labour market polices, regardless of the 
measurement used. On average, in 2003 they spent 0.2 % of GDP per per-
centage point of unemployment on these programmes. Continental European 
welfare states spent a lower 0.15% for the same level of unemployment. The 
Netherlands constitute an outlier among this group of countries, as its expendi-
ture levels are more in line with those found in Northern Europe. Finally, Eng-
lish speaking and Southern European countries are those who spend the least 
on ALMPs. The unemployment weighted figure is similar between the two 
groups (0.08 and 0.07 % of GDP per percentage point of unemployment). No 
clear outlier can be identified in either of these two groups. 
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Given the tradition of Social democratic dominance and the high levels ALMP 
spending in the Nordic countries, intuitively, one would probably go along the 
view that ALMPs, at least the costly variant, are an inherently left wing policy. 
Existing research and this paper show that things are more complicated. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Spending on active labour market policies (2003) 
 
 
Spending on ALMPs as a 
percent of GDP 
 
Spending on ALMPs as a 
percent of GDP per percent-
age point of unemployment 
 
Denmark 1.62 0.30 
Finland 0.91 0.10 
Norway 0.80 0.18 
Sweden 1.27 0.23 
Unweighted average Nordic 1.15 0.20 
   
Austria 0.62 0.15 
Belgium 1.21 0.15 
France 1.10 0.12 
Germany 1.12 0.12 
Luxembourg 0.26 0.07 
Netherlands 1.06 0.29 
Switzerland 0.72 0.17 
Unweighted  average Conti-
nental 0.87 0.15 
   
Australia 0.38 0.06 
Canada 0.37 0.05 
New Zealand 0.44 0.10 
Ireland 0.68 0.14 
United Kingdom 0.51 0.10 
United States 0.14 0.02 
Unweighted  average English 
speaking 0.42 0.08 
   
Greece 0.20 0.02 
Italy 0.67 0.08 
Portugal 0.71 0.11 
Spain 0.68 0.06 
Unweighted  average South-
ern 0.57 0.07 
   
Unweighted average  
(above countries) 
0.74 0.12 
Source: SOCX (OECD, 2007);  
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Literature and hypotheses 
 
Partisan effects: Left power and Christian democracy 
In Esping-Andersen’s account of the development of different worlds of “wel-
fare capitalism” emphasis on ALMPs is considered to be one of the defining 
feature of the “Social democratic” welfare regime.  The power resources of the 
left allowed the labour movement to impose a costly by effective system of la-
bour market polices, capable of securing full employment in the context of a 
rapidly changing economic structure (Esping-Andersen 1990: 167-168; Huber 
and Stephens 2001: 184). 
 
This view is confirmed in the quantitative analyse of Huo et al (2008) who find 
Left power to be positively and significantly related to spending on ALMPs. 
Theoretically they expect the Left to favour ALMPs on two grounds. First, So-
cial democrats have a preference for full employment, and ALMPs can con-
tribute to this end. Second, ALMPs are a superior way to passive benefits in 
guaranteeing wage-earners welfare. In their own words:  
 
The value of employment based human development, as a form of 
long-term insurance against social risk, serves to highlight the limita-
tion of decommodification as a fundamental objective of social pro-
tection (Huo et al. 2008). 
 
Social democratic parties, in sum, have promoted “employment friendly” la-
bour market policies. In the respect they differ from Christian democrats, who 
have intervened in the field of employment by protecting jobs and by facilitat-
ing early retirement. Christian democracy, in their words, “continues to have 
difficulty reconciling labour market activation and the principle that ‘labour is 
not a commodity’” (Huo et al. 2008: 17-8). 
 
An alternative hypothesis is also possible. Christian democracy may also be 
associated with higher levels of spending on ALMPs, but these will not be so 
much geared towards promoting participation into market employment. Its 
main objective, instead, would be to provide an alternative to market employ-
ment. With reference to Esping-Andersen regime typology, these ALMPs 
could be termed “conservative ALMPs”. Conservative ALMPs would be per-
fectly compatible with the key orientation in employment policy adopted din 
these countries, the so called labour reduction route. By removing participants 
from market employment in the medium/long term, these programmes are 
more akin to other labour reducing measures (such as early retirement) than 
to activation polices in the proper sense. These polices are costly, also be-
cause beneficiaries tend to remain longer in the programme. As a result they 
will generate higher expenditure on ALMPs. From a theoretical point of view it 
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is thus difficult to make a clear hypothesis with regard to the link between 
Christian democracy and spending on ALMPs. The result of these two contra-
dictory effects may be the absence of any significant association. Alternatively, 
one or the other effect may prevail, resulting in a positive or in a negative rela-
tionship. 
 
Partisan effects on ALMP spending are at the centre of another recent study, 
which challenges the view that Left power is associated with high ALMP 
spending. In it, David Rueda develops a more complex view of Social democ-
rats’ relationship with ALMPs. First, he argues, Social democrats in postindus-
trial societies are increasingly confronted with a dilemma. Recent socioeco-
nomic transformations have split the potential clientele of Social democrats 
into two groups, insiders and outsiders. Insiders constitute the traditional con-
stituency of Social democracy: manual workers, low to middle paid wage 
earners, public sector workers, etc. Outsiders are those who are experiencing 
disadvantage: unemployed people, atypical workers, excluded people.  Social 
democratic parties can theoretically cater for both clienteles, but sometimes 
the interests of one group clash with those of the other one. Under these cir-
cumstances, Social democrats will tend to defend the interest of insiders, bet-
ter organised and more likely to respond with electoral support than outsiders 
(Rueda, 2007).  
 
This is the case with active labour market polices. Rueda believes that these 
polices are in the interest of outsiders, because they facilitate the re-entry into 
employment, but they are detrimental to insiders, for two reasons. First, insid-
ers being protected by employment protection legislation against the unem-
ployment risk, they are unlikely to see the point in co-financing these policies 
as tax payers. Second, ALMPs stimulate labour supply and may create com-
petition for (scarce) jobs or downwards pressures on wages. As a result, So-
cial democratic parties are unlikely to support these policies In his own words: 
 
“ALMPs are designed to promote entry into the labour market of 
outsiders who will underbid insiders’ wage demands. Since insiders 
are the core constituency of social democratic parties, my argument 
implies the absence of any government partisanship effects on 
ALMPs” (Rueda 2007: 74). 
 
This claim is confirmed in Rueda’s statistical analyses, where Left power as a 
predictor of ALMP spending is either not significant or even negative (see p. 
92). 
 
Things are likely to be different, however, in countries which are not experienc-
ing a strong insider/outsider cleavage. In these countries it will be easier for 
Social democratic parties to simultaneously serve the interest of both insiders 
and outsiders. Insiders being less well protected, they are also exposed to the 
unemployment risk and thus likely to support ALMPs. In sum, Rueda expects 
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Left power to have a positive effect on ALMPs in low employment protection 
countries, and a negative one in high employment protection countries. He 
tests his hypothesis with pooled time series regression models in which he in-
cludes an interaction term Social democracy * Employment protection legisla-
tion which is indeed negatively related to spending on ALMPs (Rueda 2007: 
95). 
 
The contrast between the findings of the studies by Huo et al. and Rueda is 
striking. The data sources they use are the same. They use different model 
specifications and regression techniques, though. They also use different 
methods to control for variation in the unemployment rate. These methodo-
logical issues are discussed below. 
 
 
Cross-class coalition 
Some commentators have challenged the “power resources” view that in the 
Nordic countries ALMPs were imposed by powerful labour movements upon 
reluctant employers. Instead, they claim, the Nordic, and in particular the 
Swedish version of active labour market policy, was part of a major cross-
class compromise that allowed Social democrats to pursue their political ob-
jectives without endangering the profitability of capital (Katzenstein, 1985, 
Swenson, 2002). According to Peter Swenson: 
 
“[Swedish] Employers warmly endorsed activist training and mobility 
measures even before the labor confederation included them as the 
centerpiece of their plan for economic stabilization and industrial de-
velopment. … Organized employers were not merely resigned to 
hegemonic Social Democrats and hoping to appease them for spe-
cial consideration on particular details, for nicer treatment in other 
domains, or to avoid public disfavour” (Swenson 2002: 11). 
 
ALMPs, unlike the passive income protection policies, have what it takes to be 
regarded positively by employers. Having workers equipped with up-to-date 
skills and promoting labour supply are objectives to which most employers can 
subscribe.  
 
The claim that ALMPs are the result of a cross-class compromise can be use-
ful in generating hypothesis that go beyond the Nordic countries. If we accept 
the view that ALMPs are a form of labour market intervention that has positive 
effects for both employers and employees, then the puzzle is why such win-
win solutions to employment problems were not adopted more generally 
throughout western Europe. Why did countries like France, Germany or Italy in 
the 1970s turn to employment protection and labour supply reducing polices 
instead of ALMPs? The literature on democratic corporatism provides a lead 
here (Katzenstein, 1985). Large continental European countries felt less under 
pressure from the international economic context. The left, and through a well 
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documented process known as of “contagion from the left” centre parties as 
well, felt capable of overcoming employers resistance against their policies 
(Volkens, 2004). The situation was different in the small and open economies 
of northern Europe. Up there, exposure to international economic pressures 
prevented the Social democrats from using more draconian measures to deal 
with labour market problems. The strong unions and the Social democratic 
parties of northern Europe would most probably have had enough political 
power to impose secure employment contracts and a gradual reduction in the 
age of retirement. But these solutions, unlike ALMPs hit directly employers’ 
competitiveness.  
 
Some authors have pointed out that under some circumstances, employer pro-
tection may also be beneficial to employers (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). In “co-
ordinated market economies” where production is based on industry specific 
skills, protecting workers’ jobs encourages them to invest in the (necessary) 
skills. It also reduces labour turnover which makes the risk of losing workers in 
whose skills employers have invested, smaller. While this view may make 
some theoretical sense, it ignores a number of established empirical observa-
tions. First, the strong opposition to any form of employment protection legisla-
tion voiced by employers regardless of the production regime in which they 
operate. Second, the fact that the countries that have mostly turned to em-
ployment protection as a tool to deal with the employment crisis of the 1970s 
are not those that are typically classified as “coordinated market economies”. 
EPL is typically strongest in southern European countries, which are particu-
larly difficult to classify in the coordinated vs. liberal market economies frame-
work. They are sometimes referred to as mixed-economies in this literature 
(Iversen and Stephens, 2008) .   
 
Strong left in international economies 
 
On the basis of the above discussion, one can hypothesise the existence of an 
interaction between a strong left and the degree of economic internationalisa-
tion. Strong left parties, wherever they are, are subjected to strong rank-and-
file pressures to adopt pro-worker polices. If they are acting in the context of a 
relatively closed economy, they may go for employment protection and early 
retirement. These are policies that are clearly beneficial to wage-earners, as 
they respond to their aspirations to economic security and rest in old age. 
However, if a strong left acts in the context of an open economy, these policy 
options will be off the menu, because they would be too detrimental to the 
competitiveness of the national producers. It is worth noting that this hypothe-
sis finds confirmation in both the studies of Rueda and Huo et al., who find a 
negative correlation between trade openness and the strictness of EPL2.  
 
                                                  
2 Rueda finds a moderately significant negative relationship (Rueda 2007 : 89 ; Huo et al. find a strongly signifi-
cant negative relationship (Huo et al. 2008: 16).  
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A strong left in an open economy will be caught in a dilemma: it will be pres-
surised into defending workers’ interests by its supporters, but at the same 
time it won’t be able to rely on the traditional pro-worker polices, because 
these may have ruinous economic consequences. Active labour market po-
lices represent the elegant way out of this dilemma. 
 
This hypothesis is also compatible with two empirically established develop-
ments. First the early introduction of ALMPs in the Nordic countries, which 
present precisely this combination of a strong left in an open economy that are 
exopected to be conducive to active labour market policy.  Second, the move 
towards ALMPs that has taken place since the mid- 1990s, often under left-of-
centre government acting in the context of increasingly open economies.  
 
 
Competing claims and crowding out 
 
Institutional explanations often focus on feedback effects: new policies are the 
consequence of (unintended) effects of older policies (Pierson, 1993). In the 
context of welfare state adaptation, one can hypothesise the existence of a 
feedback effect originating in spending on traditional social programmes and 
constraining the opportunities to develop or expand new ones. In other words, 
one can expect countries that are confronting serious financial problems in 
guaranteeing the promises made during the postwar years, essentially through 
the pension system, to be less inclined to develop new policies. In these coun-
tries coverage against new social risks, such as prolonged exclusion from em-
ployment, will remain low or inexistent. In short, high spending on traditional 
programmes impedes the development of new ones. I term this effect “crowd-
ing out”. 
 
This hypothesis requires a longitudinal discussion. In fact, high levels of 
spending on traditional programmes are related to two variables: the generos-
ity of such programmes and the age structure of the population. Since spend-
ing on traditional programmes tends to be strongly related to age, an older 
demographic structure will, ceteris paribus, translate into higher spending and 
stronger crowding out effects. This hypothesis needs to be studied longitudi-
nally because as the population of OECD countries ages, the configuration of 
the two relevant independent variables changes. In the 1970s, a relatively fa-
vourable demographic structure, even if coupled with a generous pension sys-
tem, would not have produced a strong crowding-out effect. Instead, the same 
pension rules may de facto crowd-out spending on other programmes if the 
size of the older population is substantial and growing. 
   
The implicit presence of a longitudinal dimension in the crowding-out hypothe-
sis suggests that “time matters” in so far as the opportunities to expand new 
social policies, ALMPs being one of them, are concerned. As argued in quali-
tative studies, countries where pressures to develop new policies emerge rela-
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tively early (in the 1970s) can more easily set up comprehensive systems of 
activation because spending on this new policy does not face strong competi-
tion (yet) from spending on old age pensions (Bonoli, 2007, Fargion, 2000). In 
contrast, countries where pressures appear first in the 1990s or in the 2000s 
face considerably bigger difficulties, because for a large number of voters the 
key budgetary priority is not the expansion of services but is the preservation 
of the current generous pension system. This hypothesis helps us understand 
the divergence between the Nordic countries on the one hand and Continental 
and southern Europe on the other. Quantitative evidence linking the timing of 
key developments to spending on ALMPs and other new social policies con-
firms this hypothesis (Bonoli, 2007). 
 
Of course it is not timing per se that causes more or less spending on ALMPs. 
Rather, it is the configuration of two independent variables (population age 
structure and pension generosity) that changes across time, and may or may 
not produce the kind of crowding-out effect described above. Since the con-
figuration of independent variables is expected to vary across time and space, 
this hypothesis can fruitfully be examined with a pooled time series research 
design.  
 
Diffusion of policy ideas 
Over the last two decades, active labour market policies have spread across 
OECD countries suggesting that some diffusion process may be going on. Of 
the various diffusion mechanisms that are mentioned in the literature, learning 
seems the most adequate to account for the success of ALMPs (Braun and 
Gilardi, 2006, Hall, 1993). Countries facing mass unemployment may find a 
source of inspiration in promising experiences carried out elsewhere.  
 
Qualitative studies lend support to the policy diffusion hypothesis. They have 
shown that governments looking for new solutions to the unemployment prob-
lem have studied and learned from experiences done elsewhere. In Germany, 
the reorientation of unemployment policy decided in 2002, was after having 
commissioned studies on and organised fact finding missions in countries like 
Denmark, The Netherlands and in the UK. Various elements of the new ar-
rangement are clearly reminiscent of the UK approach to activation (Seeleib-
Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2007). The UK, in turn, is said to have found its inspi-
ration in the US Clinton reforms of the early 1990s. Other studies have em-
phasised the role played by international agencies such as the OECD and the 
EU, who since the mid-1990s have clearly promoted a reorientation of unem-
ployment policy in the direction of activation (Armingeon, 2007, Armingeon 
and Beyeler, 2004).  
 
Efforts in this direction have been particularly strong within the European Em-
ployment Strategy (Goetschy, 2001, Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005, de la Porte and 
Nanz, 2003). Interviews with policy-makers show clearly that in the field of 
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employment policy, countries are learning from one another and that the proc-
ess is sped up the European Employment strategy (Lopez-Santana, 2006).  
 
That policy diffusion has played an important role in the spread of ALMPs 
across OECD countries is a plausible proposition. However, this thesis lends 
itself more to investigation by qualitative methods. Some authors are trying to 
adapt statistical methods to the analysis of diffusion mechanisms, but the 
methodological problems they encounter are such that a qualitative approach 
still yields more convincing results. Since this paper relies on quantitative 
methods, this hypothesis will not be pursued further. 
 
 
Data and methods 
As it is often the case with statistical analysis, the hypotheses that can actually 
be tested are heavily dependent on data availability This paper is no excep-
tion, which means that it will only be possible to test some of the hypotheses 
presented above. Of course this does not mean that the remaining hypotheses 
are irrelevant. This is certainly the case of the policy diffusion hypothesis. The 
cross-class coalition hypothesis cannot be directly tested with quantitative 
methods. However, it is indirectly related with the hypothesis left power in an 
open economy. The idea behind this hypothesis is precisely the fact that eco-
nomic openness and a strong left are conducive to a cross-class compromise 
consisting of strong emphasis on ALMPs.   As a result, empirical confirmation 
of the “strong left in an open economy” hypothesis can be interpreted as sup-
port for Swenson’s cross-class coalition thesis. 
 
The analysis relies on data on 21 OECD countries that have been democratic 
since the 1980s, between 1980 and 2003. Former communist and other new 
members of the OECD are excluded, because the political and labour market 
dynamics are arguably different in these contexts. Are also excluded from the 
analysis Iceland and Luxembourg. With regard to the former, data is missing 
for most of the period covered. Luxembourg has been excluded because it is a 
rather particular case in relation to both its labour market and its position in the 
international economy. Luxembourg does not have an unemployment problem 
(the unemployment rate is always below 3% throughout the period covered, 
except in one year). In addition, the measurement of economic openness for 
Luxembourg is vastly overestimated because many import/export companies 
are based in that country. The trade openness indicator is artificially pushed 
up by imports that are immediately re-exported3. 
 
Dependent variable 
The objective of this paper is to account for cross-national variation in the ef-
fort different countries make in the field of active labour market policy. The 
most straightforward way to measure this is to use spending on ALMPs. In 
                                                  
3 The sum of import and export amounted to 256% of GDP in 2003. 
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comparison to other programmes, however, expenditure on ALMPs is rather 
volatile, being directly affected by fluctuations of the unemployment rate. An 
increase in the number of jobless may cause expenditure to rise simply be-
cause there are more beneficiaries to these programmes. Such an increase 
should not be mistaken for an expansion of the policy.  
 
There are a number of different ways to suppress this unwanted effect. The 
simplest way is to include the rate of unemployment on the right-side of the 
equation as a control variable. The other coefficients can then be interpreted 
as effects at constant unemployment rate. This is the approach used in Rueda 
2007. Alternatively, one can standardise the dependent variable simply by di-
viding it by the rate of unemployment. In this case, the new dependent variable 
will be a measure of spending on ALMPs per percentage point of unemploy-
ment. This is the approach followed by Huo et al. 2008.  
 
The problem of whether to use ratios or controls when dealing with the ques-
tion of how to suppress an unwanted effect has been encountered in the natu-
ral sciences as well. The consensus emerging from the literature is that if the 
objective of the researcher is to explain the absolute size of something, then 
the control should be used. Ratios should be used only if the objective is to 
explain the proportion of something relative to something else (Bollen and 
Ward, 1979, Smith, 2005). In the case of ALMPs, a ratio would make sense if 
the dependent variable were spending on active labour market polices as a 
proportion of total spending for unemployment. This ratio would have a mean-
ingful interpretation, showing the active or passive bias of policy. If the objec-
tive is instead to control for unemployment, then the inclusion of the unem-
ployment rate on the right side of the regression equation is the appropriate 
strategy. This is the approach followed in this paper. 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
Since my aim is to uncover casual relationship, all independent variables are 
lagged by one year.  
 
Partisan effects - Following the above theoretical discussion, I operationalise 
partisan effects with two variables: the share of left and of religious parties in 
parliaments. Most studies (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Huber et al., 1993, Huber 
and Stephens, 2001) have operationalised political variables by looking at 
cabinet shares, or the presence of the relevant political forces in government. 
Here I prefer parliamentary representation for three reasons. First, cabinet 
shares underestimate the indirect influence that a strong opposition party may 
have on policy, for example by putting forward popular policy proposal that 
may force the government to take action in a given policy field. Second espe-
cially in countries with majoritarian political institutions, cabinet shares overes-
timate the extent of variation in the political influence of the relevant actors. In 
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these countries, for most parties this indicator resembles a dummy variable, 
taking only 0% and 100% as values. This measure clearly does not reflect the 
more gradual character of the evolution of political influence. Third, in coun-
tries with multiparty systems, a strong opposition may be effectively able to 
veto policies that are half-heartedly supported by a coalition government. Par-
liamentary and government composition are obviously strongly related. For left 
parties between 1980 and 2003 r = 0.62. 
 
Economic openness - Economic openness is measured with a simple indicator 
of exposure to international trade: the sum of imports and exports as a propor-
tion of GDP (trade openness). 
 
Interaction left power - economic openness. The hypthesis that the Left will 
turn to ALMPs when acting an economic context characterised by strong ex-
posure to international competition, is tested with an interaction term: leftpower 
* trade openness. 
 
Crowding out effect – The crowding-out hypothesis presented above assumes 
a negative effect of spending on traditional social polices on new ones, such 
as active labour market policies. Since the effect travels through spending fig-
ures, it is possible to observe it by focusing on precisely this aspect. The 
crowding out hypothesis is tested with the variable “spending on old age as a 
percent of GDP”, lagged by one year. The more a country is spending on old 
age, the less it will be able to assign extra resources to ALMPs. While discuss-
ing this hypothesis, one should also take into account the fact that, for a vari-
ety of reasons, different countries probably consider different levels of social 
expenditure as the highest acceptable level. Put it another way, one can ex-
pect the crowding out effect to kick in at a different level in different countries. 
For this reason one needs to control for overall social expenditure. The inclu-
sion of the variable “social expenditure as a percent of GDP” allows us to con-
trol for this and to make the putative crowding out effect visible. The two vari-
ables (spending on old age and total social expenditure) are correlated (r = 
0.71) but according to the usual tests not strongly enough to create a multicol-
linearity problem. 
 
Per capita GDP - Finally, one can assume a relationship between the overall 
wealth of a country and its ability to develop active labour market policies. For 
this reason, per capita GDP in purchasing power parities is included in all 
models.  
 
 
Table 2: Variable description 
 
To be included. 
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Pooled time series 
 
The statistical technique used in this study is pooled time series, also known 
as times series cross sectional (TSCS) analysis. Variables are measured at 
different points in time in a sample of countries. This procedure has a number 
of advantages. First, it allows researchers to simultaneously exploit variation 
across space and time to test their hypothesis. Second, it increases dramati-
cally the number of observation (N), allowing researchers to build complex 
multivariate models (in this case 21 countries X 23 years =  483 potential ob-
servations). Of course the use of pooled time series makes sense only if the 
effects that are being tested can be expected to exist both across space and 
across time. This is the case only with variables that do change across time. 
Institutional variables that tend not to move (or never change) are not suitable 
for this kind of analysis. The variables selected for this study all display a rea-
sonable degree of variation, both across space and time.  
 
Together with these advantages, pooling time series across countries creates 
other problems. Generally, a pooled time series dataset does fulfil the as-
sumptions that are required for OLS regression analysis to be applicable, such 
as the absence of correlation among residuals (autocorrelation). Over the 
years, a number of methods have been put forward as to how to address this 
issue. The current standard approach in this respect is the one presented by 
Thomas Plümper and his colleagues (Plumper et al., 2005) who recommend 
the use of a Prais-Winsten transformation for dealing with the autocorrelation 
problem. The alternative strategy, including the lagged dependent variable on 
the right-hand side of the equation, as well as country and time dummy vari-
ables, has been criticised because these “technical” corrections explain almost 
100% of the variance in most models, leaving very little to be accounted for by 
the variables which are of theoretical interest.  
 
 
Results 
 
Many of the independent variables studied in this paper are obviously associ-
ated. Even though this does not create a multicollinearity problem, association 
among IVs affects the individual coefficients in models that combine several 
variables. For this reason, different models displaying different combinations of 
IVs are displayed. This allows us to identify some effects independently of the 
“disturbance” introduced by other variables. It also makes it possible to assess 
the stability and robustness of the findings. 
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Table 3: Prais-Winsten Regression of spending on ALMPs, 1981-2003. (z-
values in parenthesis) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Left parties in parliament 0.0008 (0.85) 
-0.0050** 
(-2.60) 
-0.0021 
(-1.09) 
Religious parties in parliament 0.0066 *** (4.31) 
0.0039** 
(2.76) 
0.0016 
(1.12) 
Trade opennes  0.0018 (1.51) 
0.0023* 
(2.15) 
Left parties * trade opennes  0.00011** (2.88) 
0.0000 
(0.87) 
Public social expenditures   0.0727*** (9.81) 
Spending on old age   -0.0564*** (-5.05) 
Unemployment rate 0.0171** (3.06) 
0.0187** 
(3.37) 
-0.0013 
(-0.21) 
p.c. GDP in PPP (1000) 0.0005 (1.28) 
0.0002 
(0.44) 
-0.0001 
(-0.30) 
    
    
    
Constant 0.424*** (3.55) 
0.343** 
(2.62) 
-0.467** 
(-3.32) 
Common Rho 0.83 0.84 0.76 
R-square 0.04 0.09 0.33 
N 404 404 380 
 
 
 
Discussion  
 
In model 1, only political variables are entered (and the controls). The result 
support Rueda’s claim that Social democracy is unrelated to spending on 
ALMPs, and contradict Huo’s et al findings4. This is largely due to the different 
methods used to control for unemployment. As mentioned above the method 
adopted here is the one followed by Rueda. If the dependent variable is trans-
formed into spending per percentage point of unemployment and the unem-
ployment rate removed from the controls, than left power has a positive effect 
on ALMPs spending. 
                                                  
4 The same result is obtained if the traditional measure of left power is used : cabinet shares instead of parlia-
mentary representation. 
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Model 1 sheds light also on the role of Christian democrats. Controlling for un-
employment and national wealth, Christian democrats are associated with 
higher spending on ALMPs.  The effect is fairly stable, since we find it also in 
model 2. Cross-sectional analysis of the bivariate relationship between Chris-
tian democracy and spending on ALMPs, confirms that this is weakly positive 
in each year between 1981 and 2003. However, graphic inspection of the data 
reveals that low average spending levels in countries with weak/inexistent 
Christian democratic parties are the result of a clear dichotomy between four 
high spending countries (Nordic) and seven low spending countries, (five Eng-
lish-speaking countries, Greece and Spain). On average, these countries 
spend less than those with a strong Christian democracy (Germany, Nether-
lands, Austria, Switzerland), but this is hardly proof of an effect. One should 
not make too much of this positive coefficient. The only conclusion one can 
reach is that direct effects of partisanship on spending on ALMPs are either 
extremely weak or inexistent. 
 
In the theoretical section it has been hypothesised that left power may after all 
be related to higher spending on ALMPs, but only in the context of an open 
economy. When in power in a country that is strongly exposed to international 
competitiveness, a Social democratic party will be strongly under pressure 
from two sides: its supporters will want polices that are in the interest of work-
ers. Traditional pro-worker polices (such as EPL and early retirement), how-
ever, will not be an option, because of their detrimental impact on the country’s 
economic competitiveness. The easiest way out of these contrasting pres-
sures for Social democrats is ALMPs. This hypothesis is tested with an inter-
action term of left power and trade openness, which, as expected, is positively 
related to spending on ALMPs (model 2). Countries that are at the same time 
left-leaning and economically open spend more on ALMPs than countries dis-
playing a different configuration of these two variables. Note that economic 
openness per se does not have an impact on ALMP spending. 
 
Fixed effects models show that the interaction between left power and trade 
openness impacts ALMP spending both cross-sectionally and across time. 
With either time or country dummy variables, the coefficient for the interaction 
term remains positive and significant at the 0.05 level (models not shown). 
 
Model 3 aims at testing the crowding out effect hypothesised above. One can 
expect countries that have important financial commitments in the field of old 
age pensions to be less likely to find the necessary “spare cash” to develop 
comprehensive systems of ALMP. As argued above, in order to test this effect, 
one needs to control for overall social expenditure. This is why model 3 con-
tains two additional variables: spending on old age and total public social ex-
penditure.  
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The result is a strong negative effect. Controlling for total public social expen-
diture, a one percentage point of GDP increase in spending on old age is as-
sociated with a reduction in ALMPs spending of 0.06% GDP points. Note that 
without the additional control “total public social expenditure” spending on old 
age is strongly positively associated with ALMP spending. This suggests that, 
as hypothesised, the crowding out effect kicks in at different levels in different 
countries, and it is only when controlling for this (through the inclusion of the 
variable “Total social expenditure”) that the effect becomes visible. In model 3 
the interaction term Left power * economic openness loses significance. This 
is due to the relatively strong correlation between this interaction term and to-
tal public social expenditure (r = 0.57). This is consistent with previous re-
search having shown that economic openness tends to be associated with 
higher levels of social spending (Rodrik, 1998). 
 
Fixed effects models show that the crowding out is essentially a cross-
sectional effect. In the model with time dummies, the coefficient remains nega-
tive and strongly significant. In the model with country dummies, which high-
lights the effect across time, the coefficient e remains negative but loses sig-
nificance (models not shown). 
 
Conclusion 
What are the drivers of ALMPs? This paper has attempted to shed some light 
on the factors that facilitate the adoption of active labour market polices. Of 
course, the data available allowed us to tap only into some of the factors that 
we can theoretically expect to matter here. One should be aware that there are 
certainly other important factors that contribute to explain cross-national varia-
tion in this field of policy. This limitation is reflected in the relatively low R-
square coefficients obtained for our models (they are not smaller than those 
obtained by Huo et al 2008, though). 
 
The hypothesis put forward in the first part of the paper are nonetheless com-
patible with the results of the statistical analysis. The view that ALMPs are the 
first policy choice for Social democrats acting in the context of an open econ-
omy and of relatively low commitments to old age pensions is thereby rein-
forced. But this view is attractive also for other reasons. Most notably, it moves 
beyond a view of partisan effects being constant across countries. Anyone 
who has studied or followed politics in more than one western European coun-
try knows that the policy preferences of parties carrying the same name are 
not necessarily identical. The divergence between Nordic Social democrats 
and the Southern and Continental European left is huge in this respect. By fo-
cusing on the interaction between partisan politics and economic variables 
such as trade openness, this paper promotes a more complex (and arguably 
accurate) understanding of what Social democrats advocate in different con-
texts.  
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It also helps to explain why, today, where the desirability of active social policy 
has become a new consensus, some countries are still struggling to move in 
this direction. What they lack may not be the political will, but the spare cash. 
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